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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
More than 60% of the world’s refugees now live in urban areas, according to the UNHCR.
The social and economic impacts of refugee movements are therefore increasingly being
felt in the towns and cities of host nations. The notion of “refugee economies” has been
adopted to highlight the strong involvement of refugees in the many overlapping processes
of production, consumption, exchange and entrepreneurship. As urban refugees increasingly become the norm in the urbanizing Global South, more research on the specifically
urban economic impacts of protracted refugee situations is therefore urgently needed.
Identifying the economic advantages and benefits associated with the presence of refugees is a key precondition for making governments more responsive to refugee needs and
removing the barriers they face.
South Africa has adopted a “self-settlement” approach to refugees. The country imposes
no restrictions on freedom of movement and the geographical locations where refugees
can reside. They are not confined to refugee camps or physically separated from citizens,
which means they have direct interaction with South Africans. The self-settlement model
emphasizes self-sufficiency on the part of refugees in the process of resettlement, with little
assistance from state authorities. Many urban refugees are unable, for various reasons, to
access formal employment in the cities and turn to the informal economy for their livelihoods. Because urban informality is generally invisible to policy-makers, scorned by politicians, and seen as a site of desperation rather than opportunity, its economic significance
is often minimized.
The primary aim of this report is to examine what we call “refugee entrepreneurial
economies” in urban South Africa. Within the informal sector, refugee enclaves have often
been viewed as stagnant pools of desperation, providing narrow opportunities and limited
scope for advancement. But this is a misleading characterization. It is important to recognize the dynamism and growing complexity of South African refugee economies and to reshape our ideas about their positive economic impacts. In this report, we seek to broaden
the image of refugees and their economic impacts beyond a narrow focus on their marginal
status and vulnerability. They are viewed as dynamic agents with skills and capabilities who
can play an integral role in transforming local settings and contributing to economic development. The report also addresses the question of whether geographical location makes a
difference to the nature of refugee entrepreneurial economies by contrasting refugee enter-
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prise in a major South African city (Cape Town) with that in several smaller towns in a
different part of the country (Limpopo province).
Cape Town was chosen as one of two study sites because there is a significant concentration of refugees in the city. In 2015, SAMP conducted surveys of migrant entrepreneurs in
Cape Town and Johannesburg and found that in Cape Town, one-third of the respondents
were refugees. In recent years, refugee entrepreneurs have also been establishing businesses
in smaller urban areas around the country. In contrast to Cape Town, very little research
exists on refugee livelihoods and entrepreneurship in Limpopo, which was chosen as the
second site for this study. The study focused only on informal sector business owners who
hold refugee (Section 24) permits under the Refugees Act. Holders of asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits were not included as many of these migrants are unlikely to be refugees, as
conventionally defined. In Cape Town, 504 refugees were interviewed in 12 different areas
of the city using a survey instrument first developed by SAMP for the Growing Informal
Cities Project. A similar number were interviewed in Limpopo in the towns of Polokwane,
Musina, Louis Trichardt, Thohoyandou, Burgersfort and Tzaneen. In each of the two study
sites, a “control group” of 500 South Africans was interviewed (1,000 in total). The survey was complemented with 50 in-depth interviews with business owners in each research
location and three focus groups with refugees in each location.
The first section of the report compares refugee business owners in Cape Town and
small-town Limpopo to ascertain if there are any significant differences in their respective
socio-demographic and migration profiles:
t .BMFSFGVHFFFOUSFQSFOFVSTDMFBSMZEPNJOBUFJOCPUIBSFBT XJUIPOMZPGCVTJness owners being women;
t ćFFOUSFQSFOFVSTJOCPUIMPDBUJPOTUFOEUPCFSFMBUJWFMZZPVOHXJUIJO$BQF5PXO
and 77% in Limpopo under the age of 40. Very few entrepreneurs in either location were
over the age of 50.
t ćFSF BSF NBSLFE EJČFSFODFT JO UIF DPVOUSJFT PG PSJHJO PG SFGVHFF FOUSFQSFOFVST *O
Cape Town, the most numerous group was from Somalia. While there were some
Somali-owned businesses in Limpopo and Ethiopian-owned businesses in Cape Town,
the largest group in Limpopo towns was from Ethiopia. Some national groups were well
represented in both places, including from the DRC and Zimbabwe. In both Cape Town
and Limpopo, there were small numbers of refugees from the same countries, notably
Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan.
2
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t ćFNBKPSJUZPGSFGVHFFCVTJOFTTPXOFST PWFS BSSJWFEJO4PVUI"GSJDBBęFS
Limpopo has a slightly greater proportion of recent arrivals than Cape Town. In Limpopo, there is a clear time lag between year of migration to South Africa and year of
arrival in the province. As many as 64% of the refugee entrepreneurs in Limpopo had
lived in another South African town or city first (compared to only 27% in Cape Town).
t ćFNBKPSSFBTPOGPSSFMPDBUJPOGSPNMBSHFDJUJFTUPTNBMMUPXO-JNQPQPJTUIFQBUUFSO
of violence against non-South African informal businesses. Experience of violent crime
and fears over personal safety were recurrent motives for moving to Limpopo, which
appears to be a safer haven and less inhospitable business environment than South Africa’s large cities. But while relocation to Limpopo may lessen the chances of victimization, it does not eliminate them. Many of the refugees interviewed in Limpopo told stories of being robbed and having their business premises destroyed. Police misconduct
emerged as a greater problem for refugees in Limpopo.
Despite being located in very different parts of South Africa, and nearly 2,000 km apart,
the Cape Town and Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs engaged in a similarly wide range of
economic activities. The vast majority in both locations are in the retail sector (75-79%),
followed by services (25-28%) and manufacturing (4%-8%). The kinds of goods being sold
and services offered are very similar as well. Among the sampled Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs, the most common items sold are clothing/footwear, confectionary, soft drinks,
and toiletries/cosmetics. In Cape Town, the most common items sold are cigarettes, clothing/footwear, personal accessories, and confectionary and beverages.
Given the common perception among South African policy-makers that refugees and
other migrants are driving South Africans out of business, it is of interest to see if they are
selling the same kinds of goods. While no product category is the exclusive domain of either
group, South Africans dominate the sale of fresh and cooked food and refugees are more
likely to be selling footwear, personal accessories, electronics and household products.
With regard to the business operations of refugees in the two locations, the main findings were as follows:
t ćFQSJNBSZTPVSDFTPGCVTJOFTTTUBSUVQDBQJUBMJOCPUIBSFBTXFSFQFSTPOBMTBWJOHT
Around 20% of both groups used loans from relatives, 12-14% loans from non-relatives
and 12% gifts from relatives. Very few were able to access funding from banks, NGOs
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or the UNHCR. The main difference worth noting was that more entrepreneurs in Limpopo were able to access goods on credit with which to start their businesses.
t ćF NPTU DPNNPO TUSBUFHJFT JODMVEF CVML QVSDIBTJOH  FYUFOEFE IPVST PG PQFSBUJPO 
keeping business records, negotiating prices with suppliers, allowing customers to buy
goods on credit, and competitive prices. Refugees consult other entrepreneurs, suppliers and the media for information about the price of goods. There was very little difference in the frequency of use of business strategies by the two groups of refugees. Living
in a large city does seem to provide more opportunity for buying in bulk, negotiating
with suppliers and getting information on prices from other entrepreneurs. Almost a
third of the Limpopo refugees travel to Johannesburg to purchase supplies, while most
Cape Town refugees obtain their goods in the city.
t "MUIPVHISFGVHFFTJO-JNQPQPBSFBCMFUPTUBSUBCVTJOFTTXJUIBTNBMMFSDBQJUBMPVUMBZ
than those in Cape Town, their enterprises are not as profitable. The Limpopo refugees
earned less on average than their Cape Town counterparts: ZAR7,246 versus ZAR11,315
per month.
t *O CPUI $BQF 5PXO BOE -JNQPQP UIFSF BSF DMFBS JOEJDBUJPOT PG JODSFBTFE CVTJness value with significant upward movement out of the lowest value category of less
than ZAR5,000. The proportion of businesses in the ZAR50,000-plus value category
increased from 27% to 47% in Cape Town and in Limpopo from 15% to 42%, suggesting that higher-value businesses may actually be performing better in Limpopo than in
Cape Town.
The establishment and growth of refugee businesses has economic spin-offs for a variety
of South African stakeholders. The first beneficiaries are formal sector suppliers including
wholesalers, supermarkets, fresh produce markets, retailers and manufacturers. Around
two-thirds of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo purchase supplies
from wholesalers, who are easily the largest beneficiaries of their patronage. Refugees in
Cape Town are also more likely to patronize supermarkets and factories while those in Limpopo are more likely to patronize small shops. The average monthly spend at wholesalers
was very similar in both Cape Town and Limpopo (ZAR35,000).
The second major beneficiary of the activities of refugee entrepreneurs is the South
African treasury. While most businesses operate in the informal sector and are too small to
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pay income tax, they pay VAT on most goods purchased from formal sector suppliers and
do not claim rebates.
Third, as these refugees noted, they pay heavy rents to South African property owners.
While over half of both groups of refugees paid rent to a private South African owner, this
was more common in Limpopo (almost 66%). The average monthly rentals were very similar: ZAR4,838 in Cape Town and ZAR4,555 in Limpopo.
Fourth, the municipal government has a direct financial interest in its dealings with
refugees. Particularly in Cape Town, refugees pay into municipal coffers through rent for
business sites. This amounted to 22% of the refugee entrepreneurs compared with only
4% in Limpopo. These rents were higher in Cape Town, an average of ZAR879 per month
compared to only ZAR311 per month in Limpopo. Also, as many as 28% of Limpopo-based
refugees (and 21% of those in Cape Town) pay an annual licence fee to the municipality.
The cost of a business licence is much higher in Cape Town at ZAR1,959 per year compared
to ZAR752 per year in Limpopo.
Fifth, refugee businesses in the informal economy create jobs. Around half (52%) of
the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and just under half (45%) of the Limpopo entrepreneurs employ people in their businesses. The Cape Town and Limpopo entrepreneurs were
equally likely to employ South Africans (around 50% of the total number of jobs created).
While the Limpopo entrepreneurs favoured female employees (51% versus 45% of total
employees), both groups preferred to hire South African women than men (with 65-70% of
South African employees in both sites being female).
Finally, it is clear from the accounts of refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo that
one of the primary beneficiaries of their activities in the informal economy is the South
African consumer who can access goods and services much more cheaply than from formal
sector suppliers. These include necessities such as cheaper food for the food insecure, luxuries such as household and personal products, and services such as panel-beating.
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INTRODUCTION
More than 60% of the world’s refugees now live in urban areas, according to the UNHCR.
The social and economic impacts of refugee movements are therefore increasingly being
felt in the towns and cities of host nations. In general, the presence of refugees among urban
populations is more likely to be assessed in terms of perceived burdens than benefits.1 Only
recently has interest emerged in what has been characterized as the positive “economic lives
of refugees.”2 Some researchers have adopted the notion of “refugee economies” to highlight the strong involvement of refugees in the many overlapping processes of production,
consumption, exchange, entrepreneurship, and development of financial and capital markets in host countries and beyond.3 However, it would be a mistake to imagine that there
are discrete spatially and economically isolated “refugee economies” in the urban environment. Refugees may dominate particular economic and geographical niches in the urban
economy but they continuously interact with and contribute to that economy in ways that
are poorly understood. As refugees increasingly become the norm in the urbanizing Global
South, more research on the specifically urban economic impacts of protracted refugee
situations is therefore urgently needed.4
This report aims to contribute to recent literature that takes “refugee livelihoods” as
its point of departure.5 A livelihoods perspective underscores the need to adopt a rightsbased approach to the economic activities of forced migrants; to identify their resources,
assets and skills; and to understand how they respond to their situation and secure their
livelihood needs. This perspective represents a move away from welfare-centred models of
engagement focused on meeting basic needs towards a capability approach, which emphasizes refugees’ agency, right to choose, and ability to control their own environments.6 Identifying the economic advantages and benefits associated with the presence of refugees is a
key precondition for making governments and local elites more responsive to refugee needs
and removing the barriers they face.7 This objective coheres with the UNHCR’s Global
Strategy for Livelihoods, which underscores the need to enhance the economic capabilities
of refugee populations and build on their own resilience.8
The sizable case-study literature on refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa is
dominated by an overwhelming sense of the problems they face and their marginalized
existence, reinforcing an image of victimhood, exploitation and vulnerability.9 In recent
years, a more troubling image has emerged of refugees as unfair and underhand competi-
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tors who disadvantage poor South Africans.10 Both characterizations suffer from obvious
problems. The former treats them in a restricted manner as undifferentiated, homogeneous
populations defined by their marginalized status as recipients of protection in the host
country. The latter views them in a prejudicial manner through a warped understanding
of the nature of economic competition and refugee rights. Undue emphasis on their legal
standing as refugees tends to minimize their educational qualifications and credentials,
skills, and work experience in various fields. Furthermore, it underestimates their creative
energies, determination and ability to overcome some of these challenges and rebuild their
lives in South Africa.
Post-apartheid South Africa has relied on a “self-settlement” approach to refugees.11
The country imposes no restrictions on freedom of movement and the geographical locations where refugees can reside. They are not confined to refugee camps or physically separated from citizens, which means they have direct interaction with South Africans with
the potential for both conflict and integration into local communities. However, the South
African self-settlement model does emphasize self-sufficiency on the part of refugees in
the process of resettlement, with little assistance from state authorities.12 Existing studies
suggest that many urban refugees are unable, for various reasons, to access formal employment in the cities and turn to the informal economy for their livelihoods.13 Employment or
self-employment in the informal economy becomes a desirable option, if not a necessity.
Because urban informality is generally invisible to policy-makers, scorned by politicians,
and seen as a site of desperation rather than opportunity, its economic significance is often
minimized.14
The primary aim of this report is to examine what we call “refugee entrepreneurial
economies” in urban South Africa. The report builds on case-study evidence on the activities of refugees in the South African informal economy.15 Within the informal sector, refugee enclaves have often been viewed as stagnant pools of desperation, providing narrow
opportunities and limited scope for advancement. But this, too, is a misleading characterization. It is important to recognize the dynamism and growing complexity of South African refugee economies and to re-shape our ideas about their positive economic impacts.16
The important question is whether all forms of refugee activity in the informal sector are
associated with economic precariousness and social marginality, or whether possibilities
for real economic advancement exist.17
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In this report, we seek to broaden the image of refugees and their economic impacts
beyond a narrow focus on their marginal status and vulnerability. We view them as dynamic
agents with skills and capabilities who can play an integral role in transforming local settings and contributing to economic development. This is not to undervalue the divergent
ways through which refugees earn a living in South Africa, nor to gloss over their struggles
and the pervasive discrimination, hostility and xenophobic violence they regularly encounter, nor to exaggerate the significance of refugee entrepreneurship. However, there is a need
to recalibrate the narrow, partial and negative lens through which their economic potential is evaluated by politicians and policy-makers. Here, we also address the question of
whether geographical location makes a difference to the nature of refugee entrepreneurial
economies by contrasting refugee enterprise in a major South African city (Cape Town)
with that in several smaller towns in a different part of the country (Limpopo province).
Our aim is to ascertain whether geography matters in framing the activities, challenges and
impacts of refugee entrepreneurial economies.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Most refugees are initially drawn to the major South African cities of Johannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. In this study of refugee entrepreneurship, the city of
Cape Town was chosen as one of two study sites because there is a significant concentration
of refugees and a contextual literature on refugee entrepreneurship in the city.18 In recent
years, refugee entrepreneurs have also been establishing businesses in smaller urban areas
around the country. A police campaign called Operation Hardstick in Limpopo province in
2012 forcibly closed as many as 600 small businesses run by migrants and refugees, suggesting that this province had become a significant operating location for small-town entrepreneurs. In contrast to Cape Town, however, very little research exists on refugee livelihoods
and entrepreneurship in Limpopo, which was chosen as the second site for this study.19
The study focused only on informal sector business owners who hold refugee (Section 24) permits under the Refugees Act. Holders of asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits
were not included as many of these migrants are unlikely to be refugees, as conventionally
defined. The South African government claims that 90% of asylum-seeker permit holders
are “economic migrants” and not genuine refugees as defined by the Refugee Conventions.
While this figure has been disputed by researchers, it is not possible to predict whether
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any particular asylum-seeker permit holder will make the transition to full refugee status.
Indeed, the majority probably will not.20 In 2015, SAMP conducted surveys of migrant
entrepreneurs in Cape Town and Johannesburg and found that in Cape Town, one third of
the respondents were refugees.21 All potential respondents were asked if they had a Section
24 permit as a filtering question. They were not asked to show their permits to verify their
claim as this would have been intrusive and redolent of police (mis)conduct. It is therefore
possible that some of the respondents did not have Section 24 permits (which could explain
why a small number were from countries with a limited or non-existent official record of
successful refugee applications in South Africa). However, it is also possible to buy a false
Section 24 permit through various back channels.
The number and geographical location of refugee enterprises in South Africa is
unknown, which means that there is no comprehensive population from which to draw a
sample. The study therefore relied on maximum variation sampling (MVS) using the methodology suggested by a recent study of the informal economy in Bangalore.22 The basic
principle is that by randomly sampling within a selection of diverse and contrasting areas
of the city, researchers can arrive at a sample that is very close to being representative.
In Cape Town, the areas of the city in which the informal economy is known to operate
were first identified. This allowed for the exclusion of significant areas of the city from the
study, particularly high-income residential areas. Second, five different types of area were
identified – commercial, formal residential, informal residential, mixed formal and informal residential, and industrial. Within each of these types, contrasting and geographically
separated areas were chosen. There were two commercial areas (the CBD and Bellville), two
industrial areas (Maitland and Parow), three formal residential areas (Observatory, Delft
and Nyanga), three informal settlements (Khayelitsha, Imizamo Yethu and Masiphumelele)
and two mixed formal and informal residential areas (Philippi and Dunoon).
The number of refugee business owners interviewed in each suburb is listed in Table
1. An attempt was made to interview similar numbers in each area. However, this was not
always possible as it soon became evident that refugee entrepreneurs tend to cluster in certain areas of the city. In Nyanga, Dunoon and Masiphumelele, for example, where there is a
great deal of hostility towards foreign nationals, it was difficult to find refugees conducting
businesses. In contrast, residential areas such as Parow, Maitland, Cape Town CBD, Bellville and Observatory are considered relatively safe areas to conduct business. Interviews
in one pre-selected area could not be carried out because of the intervention of the local
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taxi association which demanded financial recompense in exchange for access to the area.
It transpired that the association was running a protection racket, obliging refugees to pay
daily “fees” for operating in the area. The association later changed its position on access but
by then another area had been selected and the interviews completed.
Table 1: Cape Town Interview Locations

Suburb

No.

Bellville

91

CBD

103

Delft

26

Imizamo Yethu

34

Khayelitsha

25

Maitland

40

Masiphumelele

10

Parow

82

Philippi

21

Dunoon

42

Nyanga

3

Observatory
Total

27
504

In Limpopo, the majority of migrant entrepreneurs live in urban centres. Since many
of these centres are relatively small, the primary criterion for the application of MVS in
Limpopo was variable urban size. The selected towns are scattered around the province
and include Polokwane (population of 130,000), Thohoyandou (70,000), Musina (43,000),
Louis Trichardt (25,000), Tzaneen (14,500) and Burgersfort (6,000). The number of refugee business owners interviewed in each town is listed in Table 2. In Musina, close to the
Zimbabwean border, the informal trade is dominated by refugees from countries including
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, who deal in retail targeted at the Zimbabwean market. The
same is true of Burgersfort, where most local people prefer to lease their business premises to migrants and refugees rather than operate businesses themselves. In Tzaneen and
Polokwane, however, informal businesses operated by South Africans tend to dominate. In
Tzaneen, in particular, there were few refugee entrepreneurs operating and those who were
tended to congregate in the CBD.
10
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Table 2: Limpopo Interview Locations

Town

No.

Polokwane

159

Musina

121

Louis Trichardt

36

Thohoyandou

59

Burgersfort

96

Tzaneen

33

Total surveyed

504

Sampling was conducted in each site using the mapped grid-pattern exhibited by streets.
Streets were sampled one after another in successive fashion moving from west to east.
After identifying the first five enterprises on a street, and randomly selecting the first of the
five for the sample, every third refugee-owned enterprise was selected for interview. Where
business owners were not available, fieldworkers made three call backs to the enterprise,
after which a substitution was made. In the two study areas combined, a total of 1,008 refugee entrepreneurs were interviewed. The survey was administered using tablet technology
and collected information on a wide variety of issues pertaining to business set-up, activities, operation, profitability, challenges, and economic impacts. The enterprise survey was
complemented with 50 in-depth interviews with business owners in each research location
and three focus groups with refugees from the same country in each location.

REFUGEE PROFILE
This section of the report compares refugee business owners in Cape Town and smalltown Limpopo to ascertain if there are any significant differences in their respective sociodemographic and migration profiles. First, male refugee entrepreneurs clearly dominate in
both areas, with only 20-25% of business owners being women (Table 3). This is generally
consistent with the predominantly male character of refugee migration to South Africa.
The entrepreneurs in both locations tend to be relatively young with 80% in Cape Town and
77% in Limpopo under the age of 40. Very few entrepreneurs in either location were over
the age of 50. Accepting the International Labour Organization definition of “youth” in
Africa as anyone under the age of 35, this would mean that 54% of those in Cape Town and
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57% of those in Limpopo are youth entrepreneurs.23 This means that there are no significant
differences between the two groups of entrepreneurs in terms of age profile. However, it
does mean that the difficulties and challenges facing young entrepreneurs in South Africa,
and how these are addressed by refugee youth, warrant further investigation.24
Table 3: Sex, Age and Country of Origin Profile of Refugee Entrepreneurs

Cape Town %

Limpopo %

Male

75.2

80.0

Female

24.8

20.0

<21

0.0

0.2

21-25

8.5

10.8

26-30

20.1

23.4

31-35

25.2

22.2

36-40

26.6

21.0

41-45

12.2

11.4

46-50

4.3

6.8

>50

3.0

4.4

Somalia

26.9

7.4

DRC

16.9

11.0

Cameroon

11.6

0.8

Ethiopia

9.2

28.1

Zimbabwe

7.2

11.1

Congo Brazzaville

3.0

0.6

Burundi

1.4

0.6

Angola

1.0

0.6

Rwanda

0.8

0.2

Sudan

0.2

1.0

Eritrea

0.2

4.6

Other

21.6

34.4

Sex

Age

Country of origin

12
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Despite the similarities in sex and age breakdown between the two samples, there are
marked differences in the countries of origin of refugee entrepreneurs. In the Cape Town
sample, the most numerous group was from Somalia, which is consistent with other studies
showing a significant Somali presence in the informal economy of the city.25 While there
are some Somali-owned businesses in Limpopo and Ethiopian-owned businesses in Cape
Town, the largest group in this sample of refugee entrepreneurs in Limpopo towns was
from Ethiopia (28%). Some national groups are well represented in both places, including
refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (17% in Cape Town and 11%
in Limpopo) and Zimbabwe (7% in Cape Town and 11% in Limpopo). In both the Cape
Town and Limpopo samples, there are small numbers of refugees from the same countries,
notably Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan. In sum, both
areas are dominated by refugees from one or two (different) countries but after that there is
considerable diversity in the makeup of the refugee entrepreneurial population.
The vast majority of sampled refugee business owners (over 90% in both research locations) arrived in South Africa after 2000 (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Year of Arrival in South Africa
50
45
40
Percentage

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

1991-1995

1996-2000

2001-2005
Year

Cape Town refugees (n=501)

2006-2010

2011-2016
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Limpopo has a slightly greater proportion of recent arrivals than Cape Town. For example, 71% of the refugees in Limpopo migrated to South Africa after 2005 compared to 61%
of those in Cape Town. Or again, 26% of those in Limpopo arrived in South Africa after
13
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2010, compared to only 16% in Cape Town. This raises the possibility that more recent
forced migrants may be avoiding the large cities and going straight to smaller urban centres. However, in Limpopo there is a clear lag between year of migration to South Africa
and year of arrival in the province (Figure 2). As many as 64% of the sampled refugee
entrepreneurs in Limpopo had lived in another South African town or city first (compared
to only 27% in Cape Town) (Table 4). In other words, Cape Town was the first destination
for nearly three-quarters of the refugee entrepreneurs in that sample while Limpopo was
the first destination for only 13% of the entrepreneurs sampled there.
Figure 2: Migration of Limpopo Entrepreneurs
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In the Limpopo sample, previous places of residence were dominated by the large cities,
especially Johannesburg (29%) and Pretoria (13%), but also Durban (5%) and even Cape
Town (5%), which is nearly 2,000 km away. The movement of refugees from Limpopo to
Cape Town was much more limited. As many as 17% of the Limpopo refugees had lived
in another town in the province, suggesting the existence of some intra-provincial mobility. This kind of movement was virtually absent in the case of Cape Town and the Western
Cape province. In the Cape Town sample, the majority of the 28% who had lived in another
urban area came from Johannesburg, with much smaller numbers from cities such as Pretoria and Durban.
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Table 4: Previous Places of Residence in South Africa

Cape Town %

Limpopo %

15.7

29.0

Pretoria

4.2

12.9

Durban

3.2

5.0

Cape Town

n/a

4.6

Port Elizabeth

1.6

2.4

Other Western Cape

0.2

1.2

Other Limpopo

1.2

16.9

Other Gauteng

0.0

1.6

Other KwaZulu-Natal

0.2

1.2

Other Eastern Cape

0.2

0.2

Free State

0.4

1.6

North West

0.2

1.6

Northern Cape

0.6

1.4

Mpumalanga

0.4

6.7

Major cities
Johannesburg

Other urban centres

Note: Multiple response question

The major reason for relocation from large cities to small-town Limpopo is clearly the
pattern of violence against non-South African informal businesses.26 Nationwide xenophobic attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 led to considerable loss of life, damage
to property and internal displacement.27 In 2015, widespread xenophobic violence again
wracked the country. Unlike the indiscriminate violence of 2008, these attacks mainly
targeted small informal businesses run by migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. Media
coverage of xenophobic incidents chronicles an escalating pattern of xenophobic violence
directed at migrants and refugees between 2008 and 2015.28 Refugee-owned businesses
are regular targets of attacks and certain locations have witnessed collective violence in
repeated cycles, including loss of store contents through looting and arson, damage to shop
structures, forcible store closures, temporary or permanent displacement, and loss of life.29
The impact of xenophobic violence is exacerbated by poor police response and follow-up.
Refugees have little faith in police protection or judicial reparation.30 According to one
15

refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban south africa

study, the perceived failure of the authorities to control migration has exacerbated violent
attacks on migrants and refugees.31
Some studies have suggested that attacks on refugee-owned businesses are instigated or
orchestrated by South African competitors, including various shadowy informal business
associations.32 This phenomenon – dubbed “violent entrepreneurship” – involves the use of
intimidatory violence as a business strategy to drive non-South African competitors out of
an area.33 The most frequent and intense xenophobic attacks and instances of violent entrepreneurship have occurred in low-income neighbourhoods in large cities. The in-depth
interviews with Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs confirmed that xenophobic violence was
a major factor in relocation from cities of first refuge. One Somali refugee recounted how
he had arrived in Johannesburg after a long and difficult journey through several countries; experiences consistent with that of other Somali refugees.34 In Johannesburg, he lived
with his brother and neighbours from the same village in Somalia. His brother operated a
business buying goods in the CBD and selling them at his shop in Soweto. He worked for
his brother for a while but found the experience unnerving: “I did not want to operate in
Soweto. The people there were nice but there were others who were just rough. I had seen
two people being killed in broad daylight and they were all foreigners and their shops were
robbed. So I wanted to go somewhere else.” With his brother’s assistance he bought a small
spaza (informal shop) in Orange Farm south of Johannesburg and ran it for a year:
Orange Farm was a good area for business but it was not safe. As a foreigner
you are always conscious of your security and you can feel that this place is not
good. It is far from the Johannesburg CBD and there are few police there. So
even when there are robberies, the police come very late and sometimes they do
not come at all. I was robbed seven times in the period that I stayed in Orange
Farm. Most of the time the robbers would come when it is at night and you are
still operating. They pounce on you with sticks, spanners or iron bars and they
hit you hard. So I was almost killed twice and I thought this is enough. Let me
leave this place. Then I left and came here.35
Experience of violent crime and fears over personal safety were recurrent motives for
moving to Limpopo. Interviewees moved to escape being injured or murdered rather than
specifically to set up a new business. One Eritrean refugee, for example, had his spaza looted
and burnt to the ground: “I came here because I was running for my life. I was not thinking
of doing business, but of surviving. I was almost killed that night.”36
16

migration policy series no. 76

Some have said that South African business owners are just as vulnerable to violent
attacks and crime as their refugee counterparts and suggest that xenophobia is therefore
not a factor.37 However, the interviewees in Limpopo clearly saw the violence in Johannesburg and other centres as motivated by xenophobia. As the former Orange Farm business
owner noted: “There were many spaza shops around me, but they kept stealing from me. Is
that not xenophobia? Why not steal from the locals? The customers sometimes harass you
because you are a foreigner. They take your goods and are a problem in paying. So, yes, I
have been affected a lot by xenophobia.”
Limpopo province appears to be a safer haven and less inhospitable business environment than South Africa’s large cities. As many as 45% of sampled Cape Town refugees said
that xenophobia had affected their business operations to some extent (20%) or a great deal
(25%). The equivalent figures in Limpopo were 31% in total (19% to some extent and 12%
not at all). Refugees in Cape Town appear to be more vulnerable to theft and physical attack
from South African citizens. In the sample, 57% of refugees in Cape Town reported often or
sometimes having goods and stock stolen compared to 39% in Limpopo. Similarly, 54% in
Cape Town often or sometimes had money stolen compared to 32% in Limpopo.
But while relocation to Limpopo may lessen the chances of victimization, it certainly
does not eliminate them. Many of the refugees interviewed in Limpopo told stories of being
robbed and having their business premises destroyed. Police disregard for the rights of
refugees and migrants is a significant problem in Cape Town and other large cities.38 However, police misconduct emerged as a greater problem for refugees in Limpopo. This survey
found that police harassment, demands for bribes, confiscation of goods, and physical violence were all more common in Limpopo than Cape Town (Table 5).
Table 5: Challenges Faced by Refugee Entrepreneurs in South Africa

Cape Town (% often/sometimes)

Limpopo (% often/sometimes)

Theft of goods/stock

56.7

38.7

Theft of money/income

44.2

31.8

Physical violence by South Africans

23.5

19.2

Confiscation of goods by police

10.2

19.1

Harassment/demands for bribes by police

10.7

26.5

6.8

8.8

Verbal insults

32.6

35.7

Prejudice against my nationality

48.0

47.9

Physical violence by police
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BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS AND STRATEGIES
Despite being located in very different parts of South Africa, and nearly 2,000 km apart, the
sampled Cape Town and Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs engaged in a similarly wide range
of economic activities. The vast majority of the sample in both locations are in the retail
sector (75-79%), followed by services (25-28%) and manufacturing (4-8%) (Table 6). The
kinds of goods being sold and services offered are very similar as well. Among the sampled
Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs, the most common items sold are clothing/footwear, confectionary, soft drinks, and toiletries/cosmetics. In Cape Town, the most common items
sold are cigarettes, clothing/footwear, personal accessories, and confectionary and beverages (Table 7). Comparing the two, the main difference lies in the greater numbers of refugees selling confectionary, toiletries and cosmetics, and household products in Limpopo.
Table 6: Economic Sector of Refugee Enterprises

Cape Town
Retail, trade and wholesale
Manufacturing
Services
Other

Limpopo

No.

%

No.

%

400

79.4

378

75.0

38

7.5

22

4.4

128

25.4

143

28.4

1

0.2

1

0.2

Given the common perception among South African policy-makers that refugees and
other migrants are driving South Africans out of business, it is of interest to see if they
are selling the same kinds of goods. While no product category is the exclusive domain of
either group, it is clear from comparison with a control group of 1,000 South Africans in
Limpopo and Cape Town that different market niches are occupied. This is particularly evident in the sale of fresh and cooked food (where South Africans are clearly in the majority
in both locations) and footwear, personal accessories, electronics and household products
(where refugees predominate) (Table 7). With regard to services, the main difference is in
hair braiding and hair salons where there are more refugees than South Africans involved
in both Limpopo and Cape Town.
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Table 7: Goods and Services Offered by Refugee and South African Entrepreneurs

Cape Town

Limpopo

Refugee
%

South African
%

Refugee
%

South African
%

Soft drinks (e.g. Coke, Fanta)

23.0

12.4

21.6

13.8

Cigarettes

21.4

6.6

18.5

19.3

Clothing and footwear

18.8

12.4

20.2

3.5

Personal accessories (e.g. bags, sunglasses)

14.5

8.2

18.5

4.2

Confectionary (sweets/candies and cakes)

13.7

10.8

20.2

23.5

Fresh produce (fruits and vegetables)

11.3

17.3

15.5

35.7

Toiletries and cosmetics

9.5

3.4

20.0

4.4

Cooked food ready to eat

7.5

19.9

6.0

17.1

Electronics

6.3

1.4

8.7

2.1

Arts and crafts

5.0

1.4

0.2

0.9

Books/newspapers

3.8

0.8

2.0

0.5

Household products

3.6

2.4

15.1

4.2

Hardware/tools

1.6

1.8

2.8

0.5

Music/film CDs/DVDs

1.0

0.8

4.2

1.4

Car parts

0.8

0.8

0.2

0.2

Livestock (e.g. chickens)

0.2

2.4

0.2

1.1

Alcohol

0.4

0.2

0.4

1.6

Other

9.9

13.5

18.5

16.8

10.9

5.0

19.2

7.6

IT/internet

4.4

1.2

1.0

0.7

Telephone

1.6

0.0

1.6

2.3

Shoe repairs

1.2

2.0

0.2

1.9

Traditional doctor

0.4

0.4

0.0

0.0

Accommodation

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Car repairs

0.2

0.8

0.8

1.6

Medicine (pharmacy)

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.2

Transportation (taxi/passengers)

0.2

0.8

0.2

0.2

Car wash

0.0

2.6

0.8

4.1

Retail

Services
Haircutting and braiding
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Financial

0.0

0.0

0.2

0.5

Rentals

0.0

0.4

0.2

0.4

Transportation (goods)

0.0

0.2

0.2

0.2

Construction

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.2

Car parking/guarding

0.0

3.8

0.0

1.1

Other

5.4

5.2

5.8

5.5

The primary sources of business start-up capital in both areas were very similar, suggesting that being in a large city does not provide additional financing opportunities (Table
8). Approximately 85% of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo used
their personal savings to start their business. Around 20% of both groups used loans from
relatives, 12-14% loans from non-relatives and 12% gifts from relatives. A small number in
both areas used remittances from outside the country to establish their businesses. Only
a handful of refugees in both areas were able to access funding from banks, NGOs or the
UNHCR. The only difference worth noting was that more entrepreneurs in Limpopo were
able to access goods on credit with which to start their businesses.
Table 8: Primary Sources of Refugee Start-Up Capital

Cape Town %

Limpopo %

Personal savings

85.9

84.3

Loan from relatives

19.8

20.2

Gift from relatives

13.7

11.7

Loan from non-relatives

12.1

14.3

Loan from church

2.4

0.2

Money from relatives in another country

2.4

2.4

Loan from mosque

1.4

0.2

Loan from informal financial institutions

1.2

1.4

Bank loan

0.8

1.2

Loan from government agency

0.2

0.0

Goods on credit

0.0

9.1

Loan or grant from NGO

0.0

1.4

Loan or grant from UNHCR

0.0

0.4

Usurers/mashonisa (money lenders)

0.0

0.2

Other source

2.2

6.9
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Despite the similarities in sources of start-up capital, the amounts needed to establish
a business did differ. In Limpopo, the sampled refugee entrepreneurs seemed to be able to
start a business with less capital. Thirty-four percent had less than ZAR5,000 compared to
21% of the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and 63% had less than ZAR10,000 compared
to 52% of the Cape Town entrepreneurs. At the other end of the scale, 27% of the sampled
Cape Town refugees had more than ZAR50,000 in start-up capital compared to only 15%
of those in Limpopo.
Figure 3: Amount of Start-Up Capital Used by Refugee Entrepreneurs
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Despite their lack of prior business experience, refugees in South Africa have developed strategies to maximize their returns. Table 9 lists a variety of business strategies and
shows how many sampled refugees employ them in the conduct of their business. The most
common strategies include bulk purchasing, extended hours of operation, keeping business records, negotiating prices with suppliers, allowing customers to buy goods on credit,
and competitive prices. Refugees consult other entrepreneurs, suppliers and the media for
information about the price of goods. These are all commonsense business strategies and
certainly do not fall into the category of underhand and secret tactics that the South African
Minister of Small Business Development has accused them of employing. There was very
little difference in the frequency of use of business strategies by the two groups of refugees.
Living in a large city does seem to provide more opportunity for buying in bulk, negotiating with suppliers and getting information on prices from other entrepreneurs, however.
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Almost one-third of the Limpopo refugees travel to Johannesburg to purchase supplies,
while most Cape Town refugees obtain their goods in the city. This probably affords the
latter greater opportunity for bulk buying, negotiation with suppliers and informationsharing.
Table 9: Business Strategies of Refugee Entrepreneurs

Operational Strategies

Cape Town %

Limpopo %

Obtain price information from other entrepreneurs

75.6

57.9

Purchase stock in bulk

69.7

56.3

Extended hours of operation

69.5

65.5

Negotiate prices with suppliers

67.7

59.8

Keep business records

59.4

55.7

Call suppliers for information on prices

57.2

61.2

Negotiate prices with customers

47.8

60.5

Offer credit to customers

42.0

44.8

Sell goods more cheaply than competitors

42.0

38.6

Charge different prices for different customers

37.1

30.3

Give discounts to regular customers

34.9

39.1

Consult media for price information

31.9

28.1

Partner with other businesses to distribute risk

28.1

34.2

Engage in shareholding

10.3

25.9

3.2

7.0

Purchase insurance

ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMIES
In this study, we use two measures of business success: (a) net monthly profit and (b) the
difference between the current value of the enterprise and the initial capital outlay. With
regard to the first indicator, net profit, it is clear that although refugees in Limpopo are able
to start a business with a smaller capital outlay than those in Cape Town, their enterprises
are not as profitable. The sampled Limpopo refugees earned less on average than their Cape
Town counterparts: ZAR7,246 per month compared to ZAR11,315 in Cape Town (Table
10). Only one-third of the sampled Cape Town entrepreneurs made less than ZAR5,000
per month compared to 58% of those in Limpopo. Or again, 70% of the Limpopo entrepreneurs make less than ZAR7,500 per month compared to only 49% of those in Cape Town.
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Table 10: Net Monthly Profit of Refugee Entrepreneurs

Cape Town

Limpopo

%

cumulative %

%

cumulative %

<= ZAR2,500

14.7

14.7

18.1

18.1

ZAR2,501–ZAR5,000

18.6

33.3

40.0

58.1

ZAR5,001–ZAR7,500

15.5

48.8

10.9

70.0

ZAR7,501–ZAR 10,000

15.3

73.1

12.7

82.7

ZAR10,001–ZAR 12,500

6.2

79.3

3.0

85.7

ZAR12,501–ZAR 15,000

8.8

88.1

5.1

90.8

ZAR15,001–ZAR 17,500

1.4

89.5

2.3

93.1

ZAR17,501–ZAR 20,000

6.5

96.0

3.9

95.0

>ZAR20,000

4.0

100.0

5.0

100.0

As regards the second indicator of business success – the difference between the amount
of start-up capital and the current value of the enterprise – in both Cape Town and Limpopo there are clear indications of increased value. For example, 21% of the sampled entrepreneurs in Cape Town started with less than ZAR5,000 but only 3% of the businesses were
currently valued at less than ZAR5,000 (Table 11). In Limpopo, the equivalent figures were
34% (start-up) and 14% (current value). In both locations, therefore, there was significant
upward movement out of the lowest value category. A similar pattern can be observed with
businesses that started with less than ZAR20,000. In Cape Town, 51% fell into this start-up
category but only 26% of businesses fell into this value category. The proportion of sampled
business in the ZAR50,000-plus category increased from 27% to 47% and in Limpopo from
15% to 42%. This suggests that higher-value businesses may actually be performing better
in Limpopo than they are in Cape Town.
The establishment and growth of sampled refugee businesses has economic spin-offs for
a variety of South African stakeholders. The first beneficiaries are formal sector suppliers
including wholesalers, supermarkets, fresh produce markets, retailers and manufacturers.
Around two-thirds of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo purchase
supplies from wholesalers, who are easily the largest beneficiaries of their patronage (Table
12). Other beneficiaries vary in relative importance, reflecting the difference between operating in a large city and a small town. For example, refugees in Cape Town are more likely to
patronize supermarkets and factories while those in Limpopo are more likely to patronize
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small shops. The fact that more Cape Town refugees purchase directly from farms is primarily a reflection of the existence of a market gardening area (the Philippi Horticultural
Area) within the city limits.39 The average monthly spend at wholesalers was very similar in
both Cape Town and Limpopo. Otherwise, the amounts spent varied considerably but, in
general, the more important the source, the greater the amount spent.
Table 11: Increase in Value of Refugee Enterprises

Cape Town

Limpopo

Start-up %

Current value %

Start-up %

Current value %

<ZAR5,000

21.4

3.4

33.6

13.6

ZAR5,000–ZAR9,999

14.1

9.2

12.2

9.5

ZAR10,000–ZAR19,999

16.2

13.0

17.1

11.8

ZAR20,000–ZAR29,999

7.1

13.2

10.9

11.6

ZAR30,000–ZAR49,999

14.1

14.1

10.9

11.8

ZAR50,000–ZAR99,999

12.6

20.2

8.8

13.2

ZAR100,000–ZAR199,999

10.4

15.2

4.7

15.2

ZAR200,000–ZAR499,999

3.9

10.3

1.5

10.7

ZAR500,000–ZAR999,999

0.2

0.9

0.2

1.8

>ZAR1,000,000

0.0

0.4

0.2

0.7

Table 12: Main Suppliers Used by Refugee Entrepreneurs

Cape Town

Limpopo

No.

No.

323

292

34,565

34,908

Direct from factory

64

18

9,575

20,278

Supermarkets

49

37

12,253

3,979

Fresh produce markets

28

21

28,021

2,000

Non-South African informal sector producers/retailers

24

43

9,121

15,549

Small shops/retailers

21

90

3,738

6,876

South African informal sector producers/retailers

13

19

7,631

3,859

8

4

19,625

4,875

28

18

14,855

4,586

Wholesaler

Direct from farms
Other sources
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The second major beneficiary of the activities of refugee entrepreneurs is the South
African treasury. While most businesses operate in the informal sector and are too small to
pay income tax, they do pay value-added tax (VAT) on most goods purchased from formal
sector suppliers. One Ethiopian refugee in a Limpopo focus group observed that they not
only paid VAT on goods but were unable to claim rebates:
There are many things we do to help the economy. We operate our businesses
and we buy our stock from the wholesalers. We pay VAT there so our money
is going into the economy. We pay a lot of money that way. Some of our people
go to buy goods that are worth ZAR200,000 or even more. Some buy every
week and some buy every day. So imagine if you are paying ZAR200,000 for
goods and VAT is 14% so that is more than ZAR25,000 I am paying to the
government. Even after paying this large amount of VAT we suffer because we
cannot claim some of it because we do not have the documents. We are not
registered. If we were registered, at the end of the year we would claim some of
the VAT like South Africans do. We are actually paying more and contributing
more through VAT than most South African small businesses.40
Another participant claimed that business registration was impossible because “government does not want to register us.”41
Third, as these refugees noted, they pay heavy rents to South African property owners:
South Africans are surviving on us because we pay them money to rent their
shops. I pay ZAR4,000 per month to my landlord to use the shop. That is a lot
of money. How many local people can afford to pay that money? Locals do not
pay that kind of money when they rent. They will pay ZAR1,000 or ZAR1,500
only, not ZAR4,000. We pay because we have no choice, we want to do business
and survive.
While over half of both groups of refugees paid rent to a private South African owner,
this was more common in Limpopo (almost 66%) (Table 13). However, the average monthly
rentals paid to landlords were very similar: ZAR4,838 in Cape Town and ZAR4,555 in
Limpopo. Renting also provides refugees with a modicum of protection. As one noted: “If
your landlord is respected or feared, then you are okay because the thugs will not come and
break in.”42 The Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs were more likely to own their business
premises, although the numbers were small (7.4% compared to 2.2% in Limpopo).
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Table 13: Occupancy Status of Business Premises

Cape Town
monthly
rent (ZAR)

Limpopo
monthly
rent (ZAR)

Cape Town
%

Limpopo
%

Pay rent to private owner who is a South African
(company or individual)

53.6

65.9

7,541

4,838

Pay rent to council/municipality

21.5

3.8

860

879

Pay rent to private owner who is not a South African
(company or individual)

9.4

8.8

2,800

3,180

Owner or part-owner

7.4

2.2

Rent-free, with permission

5.2

6.4

Rent-free, without permission

1.2

10.6

Share space/premises with others

0.0

0.4

Other

1.6

1.8

Fourth, the municipal government has a direct financial interest in its dealings with
refugees. Particularly in Cape Town, refugees pay into municipal coffers through rent for
business sites. This amounted to 22% of the refugee entrepreneurs compared with only 4%
in Limpopo. Rents were higher in Cape Town, an average of ZAR879 per month compared
to only ZAR311 per month in Limpopo. Also, as many as 28% of Limpopo-based refugees
(and 21% of those in Cape Town) pay an annual licence fee to the municipality. The cost
of a business licence is much higher in Cape Town at ZAR1,959 per year compared to only
ZAR752 per year in Limpopo.
Fifth, there is a growing consensus in the research literature that migrant businesses in
the informal economy create jobs for South Africans, and that this needs to be acknowledged by government. As one refugee observed: “The government does not want to accept
that we are contributing. When they talk about us they make it look like we are only taking,
taking and taking from the South Africans.”43 Another pointed out the mutual benefits of
employing South Africans:
We employ a lot of South Africans. If your business starts to grow, you employ,
not only our people from Ethiopia, but also locals. They help with customers
and other things. They speak the language and understand quickly what the
customer wants. Even though I understand the language, there are words that I
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do not know and so it is better when you employ a South African, they will talk
and agree and I will communicate with my employee. The locals need work and
we also need workers, so it is a mutual benefit.44
Some refugees also find that employing South Africans is a form of security against
theft, although it can be a double-edged sword:
It is good security because they will know the local thugs and thieves and so they
may tell them to leave you alone. If you have a bad employee, they may connive
with the thieves and steal from you, so it is both ways. Sometimes we employ
locals that we know, when we know their parents and we talk to them so that
they do not steal and run away. It is better to employ someone from around the
area, someone in the community.45
Around half (52%) of the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and just under half (45%)
of the Limpopo entrepreneurs employ people in their businesses (Table 14). In terms of
the profile of employees, the Cape Town and Limpopo entrepreneurs were equally likely to
employ South Africans (around 50% of the total number of jobs created). While the Limpopo entrepreneurs favoured female employees (51% versus 45% of total employees), both
groups preferred to hire South African women over men (with 65-70% of South African
employees in both sites being female). What this suggests is that, in both large cities and
small urban areas, refugee entrepreneurs may be providing jobs for more South African
women than men and thereby contributing to lowering the female unemployment rate.
Table 14: Employment Generation by Refugee Enterprises

Cape Town

Limpopo

No.

%

No.

%

66

17.7

37

11.8

Female South African

120

32.2

82

26.1

Male from home country

101

27.2

81

25.8

Female from home country

28

7.5

26

8.3

Male from other countries

35

9.4

37

11.8

Female from other countries

22

5.6

51

16.2

Male South African
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Finally, it is clear from the accounts of refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo that
one of the primary beneficiaries of their activities in the informal economy is the South
African consumer who can access goods and services much more cheaply than from formal sector suppliers. These include necessities such as cheaper food for the food insecure,
luxuries such as household and personal products, and services such as panel-beating. One
group of five Zimbabwean refugees in Cape Town (including a former teacher), for example, operate a panel-beating and spray-painting business in an industrial area of the city.
In a focus group, they discussed at length how and why they had established the business,
their business challenges and the nature of the service they offer to South Africans:
We are very good at this business. There are many people who come here
because they cannot afford to repair their cars in these expensive garages, so we
are offering them services otherwise they would not be driving their cars. That is
a good service we are offering. Some of the customers actually go to the garages
first and the charges there will make them come to us.46
These refugees also argued, in a prescient manner, that their activities saved the South
African government and the UNHCR from having to support them. As one commented:
“In Europe the governments look after the refugees and every month they get paid like they
are working. But here we are working for ourselves and are saving the government a lot of
money.”47

CONCLUSION
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on urban refugee livelihoods in the global
South and, in particular, to a small but growing body of work on urban refugee entrepreneurship in cities of refuge.48 The concept of “refugee economies” is a valuable starting
point for restoring agency, self-reliance and innovation to populations all too often represented as passive victims. One of the defining characteristics of many large cities in the
rapidly urbanizing South is the high degree of informality of shelter, services and economic
livelihoods. As one study argues, this involves “highly mobile and provisional possibilities
for how people live and make things, how they use the urban environment and collaborate
with one another.”49 Furthermore, these urban spaces provide for “upscaling a variety of
entrepreneurial activities through the dense intersections of actors from different countries
and situations.”50 It is these dynamic, shifting and dangerous informal urban spaces that
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refugees often arrive in with few resources other than a will to survive, a few social contacts
and a drive to support themselves in the absence of financial support from the host government and international agencies.
South Africa is sometimes hailed as having an extremely progressive refugee protection regime by the standards of the rest of Africa. Refugees enjoy freedoms denied in other
countries, including the right to move and live anywhere and the right to work and be
self-employed. Many opt for employment and self-employment in the informal economy
because they find it extremely difficult to access the formal labour market or to establish
and operate a business in the formal economy. Newly-arrived refugees, including those with
advanced skills and professional qualifications, initially find themselves accepting menial
work on construction sites or as dishwashers in restaurants. Those with relatives or friends
already in the country often work in their informal businesses until they have saved enough
money to launch their own. They start small and with extremely hard work, self-sacrifice
and hardship, their businesses take off. South Africa, then, provides an important example
of refugee self-reliance, motivation and agency through informal entrepreneurship.
At the same time, South Africa is one of the most xenophobic countries in the world and
migrants of any kind are extremely unwelcome. Large-scale violence directed at migrants
and refugees wracked the country in 2008 and again in 2015. In between, extreme xenophobia, in the form of violent attacks on migrant and refugee-owned shops and small businesses, has escalated. The state refuses to acknowledge that xenophobia exists, much less
that something should be done about it. Attacks on foreign businesses are dismissed as
general criminality, which might be an acceptable rhetorical position if there was evidence
that the police provide adequate protection and justice for the victims. The evidence of
human rights observers, previous studies, and confirmed here, is that policing is lackadaisical at best and certainly does very little to protect refugees from re-victimization in their
chosen country of refuge. The fact that informal businesses started and run by refugees
have become a particular target means that the South African city has become a hazardous
place for refugee entrepreneurs.
Refugee economic opportunity and entrepreneurial activity is likely to vary significantly
between camp and urban environments. This report addresses the question of variability
between urban environments within the same destination country by comparing refugee
entrepreneurship in the large city of Cape Town with a population of over 3 million and
several small towns in the predominantly rural province of Limpopo, none larger than
29
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150,000. The research shows that refugee entrepreneurial activity in Limpopo is a more
recent phenomenon and largely a function of refugees moving away from large cities such
as Johannesburg where their businesses and lives are in greater danger. While Somali refugees predominate in Cape Town and Ethiopian refugees in Limpopo, the refugee populations in both areas are equally diverse and tend to be engaged in the same wide range of
activities. Less start-up capital is needed in Limpopo but the refugees in both areas pursue
similar business strategies and make similar contributions to the local economy. They face
many of the same business challenges, including problems with documentation and the
refusal of banks to offer credit, although small town policing appears to be harsher and
more corrupt. While South African consumers clearly benefit from and appreciate their
presence, migrant entrepreneurs are more vulnerable to xenophobic violence in Cape Town
than Limpopo. In short, different urban geographies do shape the local nature of refugee entrepreneurial economies, but there are also remarkable similarities in the manner
in which unconnected refugee entrepreneurs establish and grow their businesses in large
cities and small provincial towns.
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One of the defining characteristics of many large cities in the rapidly urbanizing
global South is the high degree of informality of shelter, services and economic
livelihoods. It is these dynamic, shifting and dangerous informal urban spaces that
refugees often arrive in with few resources other than a will to survive, a few social
contacts and a drive to support themselves in the absence of financial support from
the host government and international agencies. This report addresses the question
of variability in economic opportunity and entrepreneurial activity between urban
environments within the same destination country – South Africa – by comparing
refugee entrepreneurship in Cape Town, South Africa’s second largest city, and
several small towns in the province of Limpopo. The research shows that refugee
entrepreneurial activity in Limpopo is a more recent phenomenon and largely a
function of refugees moving from large cities such as Johannesburg where their
businesses and lives are in greater danger. The refugee populations in both areas
are equally diverse and tend to be engaged in the same wide range of activities. This
report shows that different urban geographies do shape the local nature of refugee
entrepreneurial economies, but there are also remarkable similarities in the manner
in which unconnected refugee entrepreneurs establish and grow their businesses in
large cities and small provincial towns.

